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Chapter III 
Framing the Issues 
Rear Admiral Carlson M. LeGrand, JAGC, U.S. Navy 
Professor Grunawalt's Introduction of Rear Admiral LeGrand 
Professor Grunawalt: rm very pleased to introduce an old friend, Rear Admiral Biff 
LeGrand, the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy. Admiral Le Grand has the 
task this morning of framing the issues that we are to address during this Symposium. 
I gather from the questions and answers and the spirited discussion following Mr. 
Harper's remarks that what you have to tell us will fall on very, very eager ears. 
But let me introduce our speaker. Admiral LeGrand is a native Californian, 
from Hollywood, and a graduate of the University of Southern California. He came 
to the Navy via the Officer Candidate Program. As an unrestricted line officer, he 
served on the USS Hassiampa, a fleet oiler, in the Gulf of Tonkin off Vietnam. He 
left active service to attend law school at the University of California Western. 
Following graduation, he was admitted to the practice oflaw in California. He was 
recalled to active duty in 1971, but this time as a judge advocate. He served in a 
variety of billets including Naval Legal Service Office, Guam, and Naval Air Test 
Center in Patuxent, Maryland. Then it was back to school again to get his Master 
of Laws degree at Georgetown University. Thereafter, he served as Special 
Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. 
Following a tour of duty as the Force Judge Advocate for Submarine Forces, 
Pacific, he returned to Washington, this time for duty in the Office of the Chief 
of Naval Personnel. In 1992, he assumed command of the Navy Legal Service 
Office, Southwest, in San Diego. Selected for promotion to flag rank in April 1994, 
Admiral LeGrand assumed his duties as the Deputy Judge Advocate General of 
the Navy the following month. Admiral LeGrand is also the representative for 
Ocean Policy Affairs within the Department of Defense and in that capacity works 
very closely with Jack McNeill. Without further ado, ladies and gentlemen, it is 
my great pleasure to introduce the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 
Rear Admiral LeGrand. 
Rear Admiral LeGrand: Thanks Jack for that introduction. I've also got to say 
that for a grandfather, you are looking pretty chipper. For those of you who don't 
know, Jack became a grandfather about two weeks ago. His son Kurt is one of our 
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young judge advocates in the Naval Legal Service Office, Mid-Atlantic, in Norfolk. 
Kurt's wife, Robin, gave birth to Jordan Kate. Congratulations! Jack mentioned 
that I was from Hollywood and he also was telling me before the meeting, that if 
I had time on Saturday night to tune my television to NBC at 8:00 and I would 
see "JAG", the series. The young hero, a good looking guy, is the spitting image 
of Kurt. I've seen the pilot, and Jack may be right about Kurt, but if you want to 
see who the JAG flag officer is; to know who this obsequious, toadying, politically 
oriented animal is .... Well, you know that little box at the end of the credits that 
says the program does not depict any real person, living or dead? That one applies. 
Let me welcome all of you to the Symposium. As I look over this audience, and 
as I was overwhelmed by the questions and comments following Mr. Harper's 
opening address, it's obvious we have an incredibly talented group of people here. 
People who are leaders in their respective fields of expertise, including some great 
folks from each of our five Services, from State and from academia. And, we're 
particularly pleased to have representatives of foreign nations here. This 
Symposium certainly offers a great opportunity for us to actively engage over the 
next couple of days in a discussion of a discipline that has emerged as one that 
cannot be ignored; one that must be considered in our operations and planning. 
My assigned mission, as Jack put it at the podium this morning, is to help frame 
some of the issues that will likely be a part of that discussion. And believe me, for 
an old personnel lawyer, that's a daunting mission. Thank you very much Jack. 
I think it certainly comes as no surprise to you in this audience that war is often 
regarded as being unkind to the environment. As myoId friend Col. Jim Terry, 
former Legal Advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, said: 
Inherent within the laws of armed conflict is the understanding that even the most 
sophisticated and precise weapons systems will exact a price upon the environment. 
While some collateral damage may be inevitable, there's a growing understanding 
that the international community's common interest is to minimize environmental 
destruction consistent with the exercise oflegitimate measures of armed conflict. 
There's a growing recognition that environmental devastation produces 
additional security concerns by depleting natural resources, by causing 
competition for scarce resources, and by displacing entire populations from 
devastated areas. 
Over the next couple of days we are going to be discussing numerous ways in 
which the law of armed conflict operates to protect the environment. Further, we'll 
examine perceived benefits and deficiencies of the current international legal 
regime and debate whether new international legal protections are necessary. 
Hopefully, the insights gained from our discussions during this Symposium will 
help us to understand how to maximize both environmental protection and 
national security. . 
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While reducing collateral damage will be one focus of the discussion, we will 
also have to recognize that, historically, the environment at times has been both 
an intentional target of warfare and subject to manipulation as a means of warfare. 
Fire and breach of dams to cause flooding to gain military advantage have been 
the most common methods ofintentional environmental destruction. We should 
also note that we stand on the threshold of further technological innovation which 
may well result in the development of other, more terrible forms of environmental 
destruction. There are, if my figures are right, currently 72 major dams and 297 
nuclear powered electrical generating stations around the globe which provide 
potential environmental targets that could cause unprecedented devastation. 
Finally, as we all know, nuclear, chemical and biological warfare has the potential 
to rain havoc on the environment. Environmental manipulation has also been used 
on occasion as a method of warfare. During the Franco-Dutch War in 1672, the 
Dutch were successful in stopping French advances by cutting a series of dikes to 
create the Holland Water Line. Likewise in June 1938, the Chinese dynamited a 
dike on the Yellow River to stop the advance of Japanese troops during the 2nd 
Sino-Japanese War. However, this action not only drowned several thousand 
advancing Japanese troops, it destroyed 11 Chinese cities, 4,000 villages and killed 
several hundred thousand Chinese. It also destroyed millions of acres of farmland 
and left several million Chinese homeless. 
During WW II, the British destroyed two major dams in the Ruhr Valley, 
causing extensive damage and resulting in the death of approximately 1200 
German civilians. The United States has been criticized for the use of defoliating 
agents during the Vietnam War, and for unsuccessful attempts to create 
rainstorms, to gain tactical advantage. On the other hand, it should be noted that 
at the end of the Vietnam War, the United States removed its naval mines from 
North Vietnamese waters and took other steps to safeguard the post-war 
environment. In contrast, the pictures of the devastation caused by Iraq in 
releasing an estimated 4-6 million gallons of oil in Kuwait and setting fire to some 
732 oil wells are certainly etched into all of our minds. 
The first session of the Symposium is going to focus on the strategic imperative. 
What impact on the environment must the military be allowed in order to win 
across the spectrum of conflict? Issues of readiness, training and actual operations 
will need to be addressed. The flip side to that, which is an examination of the 
threat posed to the environment by these operations, will also be addressed. These 
issues will then be analyzed under the existing legal framework; first as to 
protecting the environment during international armed conflict, and then as to 
protecting the environment during non-international armed conflict operations 
involving the use of force in military operations other than war. 
The law of armed conflict is perhaps the starting point here. Historically, the 
law of armed conflict has developed as the result of the experience of war, which 
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has led to two series of conventions; the Hague Conventions, containing the rules 
governing the means and methods of warfare; and the Geneva Conventions, 
containing the rules governing the treatment of victims of armed conflict. While 
not containing detailed provisions directed specifically toward protecting the 
environment, the Hague and Geneva Conventions do prohibit unnecessary 
destruction, including destruction or damage to property. These basic provisions 
are now considered customary international law that is universally binding. 
Specifically, the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 includes principles of 
limitation which prohibit unnecessary destruction not required by military 
necessity. Article 22 of the Regulations annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention, 
provides that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited. Article 23 prohibits both the use of arms, projectiles or material 
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering and the destruction or seizure of the 
enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by 
the necessities of war. 
The doctrine of military necessity, requiring subjective judgment and 
interpretation, is said by some to create a loophole or an excuse for every 
conceivable situation, so that the laws of armed conflict impose no real limitation 
and, therefore, no protection for the environment. Others maintain that the 
doctrine of military necessity invests too much discretion in the military 
commander. According to that view, in the heat of battle, the on-scene commander 
would always choose military advantage over environmental protection, justifying 
decisions based on military necessity after the fact. Additionally, there are folks 
who view powerful, technologically advanced nations, such as the United States, 
as inherently resistant to limitations on their military might, unwilling to accept 
restraints imposed by the law of armed conflict limiting their power. The 
counterclaim to these views is the current U.S. Department of Defense position 
that the existing international legal regime is sufficient to protect the environment 
during international armed conflict or military operations other than war. 
The Department of Defense position is that while armed conflict may acutely 
impact the environment, prohibitions against unnecessary destruction are 
pervasive and provide a basis for the imposition of sanctions whether criminal or 
civil. For example, Iraq has been universally condemned for the wanton 
devastation inflicted on Kuwait. After the Gulf War, the Department of Defense 
issued a report detailing the extent to which law of armed conflict concerns 
permeated strategic decisions at every stage. For instance, during the conflict, 
bombing targets were carefully selected to avoid civilian popUlation centers, 
cultural and religious structures and environmentally sensitive areas, even when 
it became apparent that Iraq was conducting military activities from such sites. In 
the view of those who believe the current law of armed conflict protects the 
environment effectively, the Allied restraint shown in the Gulf War is supporting 
LeGrand 27 
evidence that militarily powerful nations, such as the United States, are able to 
accept, implement and effectively enforce limitations on the conduct of armed 
conflict. 
Returning for a moment to the 1907 Hague Conventions, Article 55 of the 
Regulations annexed to Convention IV imposes the obligation on an occupying 
State to protect natural resources during periods of occupation. Article 3 of that 
Convention provides that a belligerent party violating that provision of the 
Convention may be liable to pay compensation. Taken together, these provisions 
of the 1907 Hague Convention require a balancing of potential destruction with 
military requirements. Have they proven enduring and broad enough to cover 
ever-evolving technology? The adequacy of such provisions addressing State 
responsibility and civil reparations will be assessed during this Symposium. Like 
the Hague Conventions regulating the conduct of war, the Geneva Conventions 
protecting the victims of war can be construed as including protection for the 
environment. Specifically, Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 
prohibits any destruction of property, whether public or private, by an occupying 
power unless such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military 
operations. Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, provides that extensive 
destruction. of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly, is a grave breach of the convention. 
Criminal and civil responsibility for environmental damage are to be reviewed 
as a part of this Symposium. Discussion concerning the application of the Fourth 
Geneva Convention in this context is also important. The Fourth Geneva 
Convention provides for individual criminal liability for any breach, and State 
civil liability for grave breaches of the Convention. While reparations were 
ultimately imposed by the U.N. Security Council against Iraq for environmental 
destruction in Kuwait, many scholars argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention 
provided a sufficient legal basis for convening a Nuremberg-type war crimes 
tribunal to prosecute individual Iraqis after the Gulf War. 
The 1977 Environmental Modification Convention, to which the United States 
is a party, limits military or other hostile use of environmental modification 
techniques as a method of armed conflict. Concerned by the use of defoliating 
agents and weather manipulation techniques used by the United States during the 
Vietnam War, the United States Senate passed a resolution in 1973 encouraging 
the Executive Branch to pursue a treaty prohibiting the manipulation of the 
environment as a weapon of war. The resulting Environmental Modification 
Convention prohibits a State from using any environmental manipulation that 
has widespread, long-lasting or severe effects on the environment for military or 
any other hostile use. Like the Hague Conventions, the Environmental 
Modification Convention governs means and methods of warfare. It applies 
regardless of the existence of military necessity, establishing an outer limit that 
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cannot be overcome, notwithstanding the presence of military exigency. Unlike 
the Hague or Geneva Conventions, the Environmental Modification Convention 
does not establish individual criminal or State civil liability, rather it provides for 
U.N. Security Council investigation and assistance by the other parties upon 
verification of a complaint. 
Now whether the threshold that triggers the application of this treaty is too 
high or too low, is likely to be a subject addressed by our last panel, which will 
assess the need for new international accords. Nevertheless, the Environmental 
Modification Convention provides some further protection against the most 
serious forms of environmental devastation. So far, I've been talking about 
conventions that have been widely ratified, including those ratified by the United 
States. Another issue that this Symposium will address, is whether the United 
States and other nations that have not yet ratified Additional Protocol I of the 
Geneva Conventions, should be encouraged to do so as a means to further protect 
the natural environment during armed conflict. Opinion on this issue certainly 
appears divided. Articles 35 and 55 of Additional Protocol I contain parallel 
provisions protecting the environment from widespread, long-term and severe 
damage. Article 35 states that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term or 
severe damage to the natural environment. Article 55 provides that care should be 
taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term 
and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods 
or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment, and thereby to prejudice 
the health or survival of the population. Attacks against the natural environment 
by way of reprisals are also prohibited. 
To see the environment as one of the four interrelated categories of civilian 
objects afforded special protection by Additional Protocol I is an evolving concept. 
The other categories are cultural objects, places of worship, objects indispensable 
to the survival of the civilian population, and works and installations containing 
dangerous forces such as dams, dikes and nuclear electricity generating stations. 
Obviously, there are many situations in which two or more prohibitions could be 
violated simultaneously. 
Supporters of ratification of Additional Protocol I, argue that Articles 35 and 
55 represent an important stage in the development of humanitarian law by 
explicitly codifying protection of the environment. They note that the 
Environmental Modification Convention prohibits environmental manipulation 
as a means of warfare but does not prohibit targeting of the environment. In 
contrast, opponents of ratification have argued that the three-part threshold for 
triggering Additional Protocol I, which requires environmental destruction be 
widespread, long-term and severe, is too high to provide real protection. The 
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understanding of the drafters of the Protocol that long-term means decades, is 
much higher than the threshold established in the Environmental Modification 
Convention whose drafters defined long-term to be more than one season. In 
addition, some countries have argued that Articles 35 and 55 of the Protocol 
include limitations upon nuclear weapons which would, of course, upset the 
balance established in nuclear weapons conventions. 
Finally, others have noted problems with Article 51 of Additional Protocol I, 
which requires parties to seek to minimize injury to the civilian population even 
when civilians are being used as so-called "human shields" for military operations. 
Even though the other party may have violated the law of armed conflict by 
locating bona fide military targets in population centers, the injunction against 
collateral injury to the civilian population remains. While the Protocol may 
contain some advantageous developments in the law of armed conflict, the 
disadvantages are such that no United States Administration has yet submitted 
the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent for ratification. 
From considerations of existing conventions, we will then necessarily turn to 
the question of whether new treaties should be developed to protect the 
environment in times of armed conflict. Now this topic has received a great deal 
of attention in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the destruction inflicted on 
Kuwait by Iraq. On the one hand, a number ofleading scholars have argued that 
ecocide, if we may use that term, was a failure of deterrence, not law. Proponents 
of this view note that Iraq wantonly breached the Hague and Geneva Conventions 
and that blatant violations of the law cannot be remedied simply by establishing 
new laws. Further, some commentators have noted that while the international 
community has become proficient at drafting and negotiating environmental 
treaties, there is little evidence that the international community is equally adept 
at implementing and enforcing them. There were fewer than three dozen, 
multilateral environmental treaties in 1972. Today, there are nearly 900 
international agreements that contain important environmental protections. 
Edith Brown Weiss has termed this situation the "treaty congestion" problem in 
emphasizing the need to shift resources from drafting and negotiating to 
supporting the implementation and enforcement of environmental treaties. Those 
who seek increased protection for the environment in times of armed conflict were 
certainly mobilized by Iraq's conduct during the Gulf War. Their proposals have 
largely focused on either restricting the methods of armed conflict or the location 
of that conflict. For example, on March 11, 1991, French representatives to the 
Governing Council of the United Nations Environmental Program proposed two 
new conventions, one protecting world heritage monuments in time of war and 
one prohibiting the targeting of ecological areas. That same day, Japan urged the 
adoption of a Declaration of Principles which would prohibit destruction such as 
that inflicted by Iraq as a method of warfare. These proposals were later discussed 
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at a Governing Council meeting on May 20,1991, in Nairobi, Kenya. Others have 
urged that protected geographical sanctuaries be established through the Cultural 
and Natural Heritage Convention of 1972. And still others have urged that 
demilitarized areas be established by adoption of conventions similar to the 
Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 
Two international conferences were convened in 1991 to address the need for 
additional law in times of armed conflict. First, Greenpeace International 
sponsored a conference in London at which it proposed a Fifth Geneva 
Convention. The Greenpeace proposal would prohibit the use of the environment 
as a weapon, would ban weapons aimed at the environment, and would prohibit 
indirect damage to the environment of a third State, irrespective of a claim of 
military necessity. This Fifth Geneva Convention would apply in all armed 
conflicts, not just to international armed conflict as do existing Geneva 
Conventions. And finally, the proposal would establish a responsibility to pay 
compensation for violation of the Convention. At present, this proposal does not 
appear to be moving forward. Second, in July 1991, a conference was held in 
Ottawa. United States' participants in Ottawa emphasized the importance of not 
unduly restricting otherwise lawful military operations. In general, the 
participants recommended further efforts be focused on enforcement mechanisms 
rather than additional international agreements. 
Finding ways in which the laws of armed conflict could be better enforced will 
also be discussed at this Symposium. While some also argue that new laws of armed 
conflict are necessary, there seems to be greater consensus for examining ways to 
improve enforcement of existing laws of armed conflict. As Professor Bob Turner 
has said about the Gulf War, "The real reason was not that the law was ineffective 
but rather, unenforced law is ineffective." 
Now, aside from use of military force, there are three ways in which the 
international community has sought to enforce the laws of armed conflict. The 
first method of enforcement has been to hold individuals criminally liable. The 
most frequently suggested model has been the use of a Nuremberg-type war crimes 
tribunal. Though many commentators urged the establishment of a tribunal to 
prosecute Iraqi war crimes, one was not established. However, the current tribunal 
established at the Hague by the U.N. Security Council pursuant to Articles 29, 39 
and 41 of the U.N. Charter to prosecute war crimes in the former Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and in Rwanda, should give us a great deal of information, hopefully, 
about the effectiveness and practicability of such a forum in to day's contemporary 
world. Now, in addition to an ad hoc tribunal, the Security Council also has the 
authority, pursuant to Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, to authorize a regional 
arrangement or group to conduct war crimes trials. However, many favor the 
degree of impartiality gained by use of an international, rather than a regional 
forum. Furthermore, there is growing sentiment to prosecute war criminals in 
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national courts. Both Austria and Denmark have recently prosecuted individuals 
accused of committing war crimes in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. While 
States have on occasion prosecuted their own nationals for war crimes violations, 
as Austria and Denmark have recently done, for the most part, they have resisted 
prosecuting enemy personnel since WW II. Nevertheless, that option may warrant 
greater attention. 
A second widely used sanction has been the requirement that the responsible 
nation make reparations, usually of monetary damages, for environmental 
degradation or destruction. During active hostilities, seizure of assets has been 
accomplished both to deter aggression and to provide a source of potential 
reparations at the conclusion of hostilities. Claims commissions may be 
established by the agreement ending hostilities or by the U.N. Security Council 
pursuant to Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter. By Security Council Resolution 687, 
the U.N. Compensation Fund was created, and a commission was established and 
charged with evaluating crimes arising out of "direct losses, (and) damage, 
including environmental damage, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait." While injured parties may eventually obtain reparations, 
the possibility of future compensation provides little comfort to individuals and 
communities that experience loss and require immediate relief. 
A third enforcement method could be described as condemnation in the court 
of public opinion. Professor John Norton Moore has long been an advocate of 
disseminating the facts of international law violations through the media. 
Moreover, Article 149 of the Fourth Geneva Convention authorizes an inquiry at 
the request of a party to the conflict concerning any alleged violation of the 
Convention. Evidence from such an inquiry may later form the basis for criminal 
prosecution. Finally, for those countries that are parties, Article 90 of Additional 
Protocol I authorizes the establishment of an international fact-fmding 
commission to conduct investigations. 
So, in summary, this Symposium will hopefully stimulate a broad discussion 
of the viability of the existing law and the need for new accords. In our opening 
panel, which will take place after lunch, we will begin with the first of our topics, 
"The Strategic Imperative." Ultimately, we will address each of the issues I have 
attempted to outline this morning, including whether the existing legal regime 
effectively protects the environment in times of armed conflict, whether the legal 
regime has been or is capable of being effectively enforced, and whether new 
developments in the enforcement of the law would better protect the environment. 
Because our national security interests, as well as the potential risks to the 
environment are enormous, the stakes regarding these issues are quite high. And, 
with the exceptional talent we have gathered here, we are looking forward to a 
productive and lively exchange of opinions. I would like to thank you all for being 
here and I hope you enjoy the Symposium. Thank you very much. 
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Professor Grunawalt: Thank you Admiral. Before we break for lunch, a couple 
of thoughts occurred to me as I listened to Mr. Harper's address, Admiral 
LeGrand's "Framing The Issues" presentation, as well as the intercessions from 
the floor. One thing I thought I would ask you to contemplate over lunch and when 
we get together after lunch, is the military dimension of the equation, the strategic 
imperative, that is, what one must do to win across the spectrum of conflict. 
Admiral LeGrand noted that it is our assessment that during the Gulf Conflict, 
the United States Armed Forces indeed were prepared to accept, implement, and 
effectively enforce international norms with respect to the protection of the 
environment. Mr. Harper pointed out, as did Admiral LeGrand, that the issue 
appears to be enforcement of that law which already exists, as much, if not more, 
than the necessity to develop further law. I am reminded of an article written by 
Professor Michael Reisman that appeared in Admiral Robertson's Volume 64 of 
the Naval War College's "Bluebook" series. Professor Reisman wrote very 
persuasively of the very positive role of military manuals in the general process of 
behavior of military forces. The whole theme here, and one again I would like you 
to carry with you and put into context when we hear from our military people this 
afternoon, is that ultimately it is not what kind of treaty one signs, it is the behavior 
of forces in the field that is going to determine whether or not military operations 
bring unacceptable destruction to the environment. You have to understand the 
critical role, the inescapable role, that comes from the subjective judgment of the 
operational commander on the scene. We are talking about a decision that must 
be taken in the crucible of conflict, in von Clausewitz's "fog of war." How do we 
do that? How do we prepare our operational commanders to do that which is right 
when these subjective judgments must be made? I believe very strongly in the 
efficacy of the military manuals approach and I recommend Michael Reisman's 
article to you if you have not seen it. Also, we are now in the process of 
promulgating the next iteration of the Commander's Handbook on the Law of 
Naval Operations, what was until recently called NWP 9. It, unfortunately, now 
has a new number, NWPl-14M. Finally, among us this morning are folks like 
Chris Greenwood, Dieter Fleck and Ivan Shearer, who have been working 
diligently in this military manual arena, to provide guidance to our military 
commanders who must make those substantive judgments so that they do so on 
the basis of that which we expect of them. 
We had anticipated that Senator John Chaffee would be our guest speaker for 
the luncheon today. If you have been following the news these past few days you 
will have noted that it is very unlikely that any United States Senator is going to 
get out of Washington for the next several days and, unfortunately, Senator Chaffee 
has had to send his regrets. Nonetheless, we will now recess and reassemble at the 
Officer's Club for lunch. 
